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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, 
 
Circuit Judge 
 This is a dispute over the disposition of proceeds from 
a decedent’s ERISA-governed 401(k) plan.  The decedent, 
William Kensinger (“William”) was married to Adele 
Kensinger (“Adele”) until their divorce in 2008.  As part of 
their divorce decree, Adele waived her right to the proceeds 
of William’s 401(k) plan.  William, however, neglected to 
replace Adele as the designated beneficiary of his 401(k) plan 
prior to his death a few months after the divorce.  His estate 
(“the Estate”) and Adele both claimed a right to the plan 
proceeds, leading to this litigation.  In light of a recent 
Supreme Court case, there is no dispute that, notwithstanding 
Adele’s waiver, the plan administrator is obligated to pay the 
401(k) proceeds to her in accordance with the plan 
documents.  The question before us, which is one of first 
impression in this circuit, is this: after the plan administrator 
distributes the funds to Adele, can the Estate attempt to 
recover the funds by bringing suit directly against Adele to 
enforce her waiver?  For the reasons that follow, we hold that 
the Estate can sue Adele to enforce her waiver and recover the 
disputed plan proceeds.  The District Court, however, held to 
the contrary.  Accordingly, although we affirm in part, we will 
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also reverse in part.   
 
I.  Background 
A.  Factual Background 
 The material facts in this case are straightforward and 
undisputed.  In 2000, William enrolled in an employee-
sponsored deferred savings plan (“401(k) plan”) through his 
employer, URL Pharma, Inc. (“URL”).  The 401(k) plan was 
governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.  At the time of his 
enrollment, William was married to Adele, whom he 
designated as the plan’s primary beneficiary.  Their marriage 
did not last, however, and divorce proceedings commenced in 
2008.  On April 20, 2008, William and Adele entered into a 
Property Settlement Agreement (“PSA”), which, in relevant 
part, provided:  
 
[T]he parties mutually agree to waive, release, 
and relinquish any and all right, title and interest 
either may have in and to the other’s IRA 
account(s), or any other such retirement benefit 
and deferred savings plan of like kind and 
character, and neither shall make any claim to 
possession of such property as it is presently 
titled. 
 
The divorce was then finalized in New Jersey state court, with 
a final divorce decree incorporating the PSA entered on July 
10, 2008.  
 
 Nine months after the divorce, William died intestate 
without having changed the designated beneficiary of his 
401(k) plan.  Following his death, a dispute arose regarding 
distribution of the plan proceeds.  Although Adele was still 
the named beneficiary of the 401(k) plan, the Estate argued 
that, given her waiver, it was entitled to the proceeds of the 
plan.  Adele countered that ERISA, which requires that the 
proceeds be paid to the beneficiary named in the plan 
documents, trumped her common law waiver.  On November 
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9, 2009, the Estate filed an action against Adele and URL in 
the Superior Court of New Jersey seeking a declaration that 
the Estate was entitled to the funds in the 401(k) account.1
 
  
URL removed the matter to the District Court. 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Decision in Kennedy  
 The leading case in this area is Kennedy v. Plan 
Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, 555 
U.S. 285 (2009).  The facts in Kennedy are virtually identical 
to those in this case.  In Kennedy, an employee participated in 
an ERISA employee pension benefit plan and designated his 
wife as the sole beneficiary.  The couple subsequently 
divorced, and as part of the divorce decree the wife agreed to 
waive her interest in her husband’s pension plan.  However, 
the husband died without amending the pension plan 
documents to replace his ex-wife as the designated 
beneficiary.  The husband’s estate claimed a right to the plan 
proceeds, citing the ex-wife’s waiver.  The plan administrator, 
however, relied on the husband’s designation form and paid 
the funds to the ex-wife.  The husband’s estate then sued the 
plan administrator to recover the benefits.   
 
The district court granted summary judgment to the 
estate and ordered the plan administrator to pay the estate.  
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the ex-wife’s waiver 
was rendered void by ERISA’s anti-alienation provision, 
which states that “benefits provided under the plan may not be 
assigned or alienated.”2
                                                 
1  As of March 31, 2011, the balance of the 401(k) account 
was $76,242.41.  On October 5, 2011, the District Court 
entered an order memorializing the parties’ agreement that 
URL would deposit the plan proceeds with the Court and 
would thereafter be dismissed from the action. 
   29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).  The 
2   By statute, this anti-alienation provision does not apply to a 
certain class of orders known as “qualified domestic relations 
orders” (“QDROs”).  29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3).  To qualify as a 
QDRO, an order must satisfy certain statutory requirements, 
such as clearly specifying an alternate payee, the amount of 
benefits to be paid to the alternate payee, the period to which 
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Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds.  
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit, the Court held that the ex-wife’s 
waiver “did not constitute an assignment or alienation 
rendered void [by ERISA’s anti-alienation provision]” and 
therefore was not invalidated by ERISA.  Kennedy, 555 U.S. 
at 297 (emphasis added).  Nonetheless, the Court declared 
that a plan administrator is “obliged to act ‘in accordance with 
the documents and instruments governing the plan,’” and that 
“ERISA provides no exemption from this duty when it comes 
time to pay benefits.”  Id. at 300 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 
1104(a)(1)(D)).  Thus, although the ex-wife had waived her 
right to the pension, the Court concluded that the plan 
administrator “did its statutory ERISA duty by paying the 
benefits to [the ex-wife] in conformity with the plan 
documents.”  Id. at 299-300.  In adopting this so-called “plan 
documents rule,” the Court emphasized the desirability of a 
“straightforward rule of hewing to the directives of the plan 
documents.”  Id. at 300.   
 
 Significantly, although the Supreme Court held that a 
plan administrator must distribute benefits in accordance with 
plan documents, it noted the open question of whether another 
avenue of recovery might be available to the estate.  In a 
footnote, the Court made clear that its holding did not address 
the question of whether the estate could have sued the ex-wife 
to recover the benefits after she received them from the plan 
administrator.  Id. at 299 n.10 (“Nor do we express any view 
as to whether the Estate could have brought an action in state 
or federal court against [the ex-wife] to obtain the benefits 
after they were distributed.”).  In light of this footnote, lower 
courts interpreting Kennedy have observed that “the Supreme 
Court may have closed one door to litigation against plan 
administrators but it may well have opened another to 
litigation between family or former family members.”  
Staelens v. Staelens, 677 F. Supp. 2d 499, 507 (D. Mass. 
2010). 
                                                                                                             
the order applies, and the specific plan impacted by the order.  
§ 1056(d)(3)(B).  It is undisputed that the PSA which contains 
Adele’s waiver is not a QDRO. 
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C.  The District Court’s Decision 
 Adele moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that she was entitled to the 401(k) proceeds as the named 
beneficiary.  The Estate opposed the motion and cross-moved 
for summary judgment, arguing that the PSA was a valid 
contractual waiver and that the proceeds, therefore, belonged 
to the Estate.  Properly relying on Kennedy, the District Court 
had little trouble concluding that, despite Adele’s waiver, 
ERISA required URL to distribute the 401(k) funds to her, as 
the named beneficiary, in accordance with the plan 
documents.  This conclusion is not challenged on appeal. 
 
 The District Court then turned to the question left open 
in Kennedy: whether, once the plan proceeds are distributed to 
Adele, the Estate may pursue a claim directly against her to 
enforce her waiver and recover the benefits.3  Concluding that 
allowing the Estate to sue Adele would undermine one of 
ERISA’s “principal objectives”—namely, that “named 
beneficiaries actually
 
 receive the benefits of ERISA-governed 
plans”—the District Court held that “the Estate may not assert 
a claim against [Adele] regarding the 401(k) proceeds.”  
(App. at 7-8.)  This appeal followed.   
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The 401(k) plan at issue in this dispute is an “employee 
welfare benefit plan” within the meaning of ERISA, 29 
U.S.C. § 1002(1).  As such, the District Court had jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over this 
appeal from the grant of summary judgment.  McGowan v. 
                                                 
3  Although the 401(k) proceeds have yet to be distributed by 
URL to Adele, this question is ripe for review because, under 
Kennedy and in accordance with the District Court’s 
unchallenged holding, URL is obligated by law to distribute 
the funds to Adele pursuant to the plan documents.  As such, 
Adele has a presently enforceable right to the plan proceeds, 
and the Estate has standing to challenge that right by seeking 
to enforce Adele’s waiver. 
 7 
NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 244 (3d Cir. 2005), abrogated 
on other grounds, Kennedy, 55 U.S. at 291 n.4.   
 
III.  Discussion 
 Enacted in 1974, ERISA remains a comprehensive and 
complex scheme for regulating employee benefits plans.  
“The statute, however, does not address many of the issues 
which arise in the normal course of the administration of such 
plans.”  Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Littlejohn, 155 F.3d 
206, 208 (3d Cir. 1998).  In such cases, “it is well settled that 
Congress intended that the federal courts would fill in the 
gaps by developing, in light of reason, experience, and 
common sense, a federal common law of rights and 
obligations imposed by the statute.”  Einhorn v. M.L. 
Ruberton Constr. Co., 632 F.3d 89, 96-97 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(citation and internal quotations omitted).  Relevant to this 
case, ERISA does not address whether a waiver of benefits 
can be enforced through a direct suit against a named 
beneficiary once the benefits have been paid to that 
beneficiary.  We, therefore, look to federal common law in 
answering that question and, as stated above, answer it in the 
affirmative.   
 
A.  ERISA’s Policy Rationale 
Kennedy produced what appears to be a somewhat odd 
result given that the Supreme Court held that a plan 
administrator must adhere to the plan documents and 
distribute plan proceeds to the named beneficiary even though 
that beneficiary had affirmatively waived any claim to those 
funds.  The Court emphasized two important policy 
considerations in explaining its holding.  First, it stated that 
ERISA’s well-established policy favoring uniform and 
efficient plan administration would be undermined if 
employers had to consider benefits claims from sources 
extrinsic to the plan documents, and it stressed the desirability 
of a “straightforward rule . . . that lets employers ‘establish a 
uniform administrative scheme, with a set of standard 
procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of 
benefits.’”  555 U.S. at 300 (quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 
 8 
U.S. 141, 148 (2001)).  Without such a simple rule, the Court 
explained, plan administrators would have to bear “the cost of 
less certain rules”:   
 
Plan administrators would be forced to examine 
a multitude of external documents that might 
purport to affect the dispensation of benefits 
and be drawn into litigation like this over the 
meaning and enforceability of purported 
waivers. . . . [I]t would destroy a plan 
administrator’s ability to look at the plan 
documents and records conforming to them to 
get clear distribution instructions, without going 
into court. 
 
Id. at 301 (citation and internal quotation omitted); see also 
Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 149-50 (discussing “the congressional 
goal of minimizing the administrative and financial burdens 
on plan administrators”).   
 
Second, the Supreme Court explained that its holding 
was necessary in order to avoid subjecting plan administrators 
to potential double liability.  As the Court noted, ERISA 
makes clear that plan administrators must pay benefits “in 
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the 
plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).  As such, allowing the 
estate in Kennedy to sue the plan administrator for disbursing 
plan proceeds to the named beneficiary would have placed the 
administrator in a hopeless bind: if it honored the waiver, it 
could be sued by the named beneficiary for disregarding the 
mandate of ERISA; if it honored the plan documents, it could 
be sued by the estate for disregarding a federal common law 
waiver.   
  
These two concerns—the need for the straightforward 
administration of plans and the avoidance of potential double 
liability—while central to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kennedy, are not implicated here.  An action brought directly 
against Adele after the benefits have been distributed would 
in no way complicate URL’s administration of the plan.  
Unlike in Kennedy, a post-distribution suit against Adele 
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would neither “destroy a plan administrator’s ability . . . to get 
clear distribution instructions, without going to court” nor 
subject URL to “litigation-fomenting ambiguities.”  555 U.S. 
at 301, 302 (citation and internal quotations omitted).  Rather, 
a suit against Adele would simply require a court to determine 
the rightful recipient of the plan proceeds as a matter of 
contract law.4
 
   
Although the District Court understood that the 
concerns underlying Kennedy did not apply under the 
circumstances of this case, it stated that in addition to “tidy 
and cost-effective plan administration,” ERISA’s statutory 
scheme also aims to “provid[e] certainty regarding the final 
distribution of ERISA benefits” to beneficiaries.  (App. at 8, 
10.)  Accordingly, the Court concluded that the possibility of 
a post-distribution action against a beneficiary would be 
inimical to ERISA’s purposes as it would undermine this 
“core objective[]” of the statute.  (Id. at 8-10.)  Although the 
Court’s conclusion was not unreasonable, we believe that its 
assumption about ERISA’s continuing solicitude for 
beneficiaries after the distribution of benefits was based on an 
overreading of Kennedy.   
 
The District Court relied heavily on Kennedy’s 
                                                 
4  Allowing a post-distribution suit to be brought directly 
against a named beneficiary would also make sense as a 
practical matter.  First, it would permit the two interested 
parties to litigate against each other directly, without the plan 
administrator being caught in the middle.  See Boyd v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 636 F.3d 138, 144 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing 
the undesirability of plan administrators having to “throw[] 
themselves squarely into the center of contentious family 
disputes”).  Second, it would avoid the anomalous scenario in 
which a valid waiver is rendered worthless because it cannot 
be enforced against anyone; indeed, the District Court 
acknowledged the argument that “it does not make sense that 
the Supreme Court would uphold the validity of common law 
waivers, but nevertheless hold that ERISA bars a claim to 
enforce common law waivers.”  (App. at 12)(conceding that 
the argument “has merit”).         
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statement that the plan documents rule promotes “simple 
administration, avoid[s] double liability, and ensur[es] that 
beneficiaries get what’s coming quickly, without the folderol 
essential under less-certain rules.”  555 U.S. at 301 (quoting 
Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. 
Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 283 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added)).  The emphasized portion of 
this statement should not, however, be read in a vacuum or 
divorced from the context in which it arose.  Both Kennedy 
and Fox Valley involved suits against plan administrators who 
had yet to distribute benefits.  When read with that in mind, 
the goal of ensuring that beneficiaries “get what’s coming 
quickly” refers to the expeditious distribution of funds from 
plan administrators, not to some sort of rule providing 
continued shelter from contractual liability to beneficiaries 
who have already received plan proceeds.  In this case, when 
URL pays the benefits to Adele, as it must, she will “get 
what’s coming” under the plan.  If, after distribution, her right 
to these funds is challenged because of her common law 
waiver, that challenge will be litigated as an ordinary contract 
dispute.  Accordingly, to the extent that ERISA is concerned 
with the expeditious payment of plan proceeds to 
beneficiaries, permitting suits against beneficiaries after 
benefits have been paid does not implicate any concern of 
expeditious payment or undermine any core objective of 
ERISA.5
 
   
                                                 
5  In support of its conclusion that ERISA continues to protect 
beneficiaries post-distribution, the District Court also relied 
on the following introductory language from ERISA’s 
opening section: “It is hereby declared to be the policy of this 
Act to protect interstate commerce and the interest of 
participants in employee benefit plans and their 
beneficiaries.”  29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (emphasis added); see 
also Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 845 (1997) (“The 
principal object of the statute is to protect plan participants 
and beneficiaries.”).  The mere mention of “beneficiaries” in 
the statute’s introductory language, however, hardly leads to 
the conclusion that a contractual waiver of benefits cannot be 
enforced after a beneficiary has been paid the plan proceeds.  
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B.  Analogous Case Law 
 Our conclusion finds further support in the decisions of 
state appellate courts and in analogous federal cases.  The 
state appellate courts to have considered the question 
presented here—the Michigan Supreme Court, the Oklahoma 
Court of Civil Appeals, and the Court of Appeals of 
Georgia—have all held that an estate may enforce a common 
law waiver against a designated beneficiary once pension 
funds have been distributed.  See Sweebe v. Sweebe, 712 
N.W.2d 708 (Mich. 2006); Pardee v. Pardee, 112 P.3d 308 
(Okla. Civ. App. 2004); Alcorn v. Appleton, 708 S.E.2d 390 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2011).  In Sweebe, the Michigan Supreme Court 
not only anticipated the holding of Kennedy, but answered the 
question left open in Kennedy:  
 
[W]hile a plan administrator must pay benefits 
to the named beneficiary as required by ERISA, 
this does not mean that the named beneficiary 
cannot waive her interest in retaining these 
proceeds.  Once the proceeds are distributed, the 
consensual terms of a prior contractual 
agreement may prevent the named beneficiary 
from retaining those proceeds.  
 
712 N.W.2d at 156.  Similarly, in Pardee, the Oklahoma court 
held that a waiver could be enforced via a suit against a 
named beneficiary because the “pension plan funds were no 
longer entitled to ERISA protection once the plan funds were 
distributed.”  112 P.3d at 315-16.  And in Alcorn, the Court of 
Appeals of Georgia relied on both Sweebe and Pardee to hold 
that a decedent’s estate could bring suit against the decedent’s 
ex-wife to enforce her waiver since she had already received 
the plan benefits from the plan administrator.  708 S.E.2d at 
392.   
 
That the Estate should be able to bring a post-
distribution suit against Adele finds further support in a line 
of federal cases holding that creditors can sue named 
beneficiaries to recover plan benefits once those benefits have 
been distributed.  A number of circuits, including our own, 
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have held that even though ERISA prevents a creditor from 
encumbering pension funds held by a plan administrator, the 
funds are no longer entitled to ERISA’s protections against 
the creditor’s claims once they are paid to the beneficiary.  
See Trucking Emps. of N. Jersey Welfare Fund v. Colville, 16 
F.3d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1994) (“We have recognized . . . a 
difference between funds remaining in the possession of an 
ERISA plan trustee and funds that have been distributed to 
the beneficiary.”); see also Kickham Hanley P.C. v. Kodak 
Ret. Income Plan, 558 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Only 
once the proceeds of the pension plan have been released to 
the beneficiary’s hands, can creditors and others pursue 
claims against the funds and the funds’ owner(s).”); 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cox, 447 F.3d 967, 974 (6th Cir. 
2006) (“This circuit, along with a majority of the other 
circuits, has held that once benefit payments have been 
disbursed to a beneficiary, creditors may encumber the 
proceeds.”); Hoult v. Hoult, 373 F.3d 47, 54-55 (1st Cir. 
2004) (same); United States v. Jackson, 229 F.3d 1223, 1225 
(9th Cir. 2000) (same), overruled in part by United States v. 
Novak, 476 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007); Guidry v. Sheet Metal 
Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700, 716 (10th Cir. 
1993) (same).  In each of these cases, the court held that once 
the benefits were distributed to the designated beneficiary in 
accordance with the plan documents, ERISA was no longer 
implicated.  The same principle is equally applicable here.  
More specifically, if a creditor can enforce its rights against a 
beneficiary once pension funds have been distributed, we see 
no reason why the Estate should not be able to enforce its 
contractual rights against Adele once URL disburses the 
funds.   
 
Despite this caselaw, Adele argues that the District 
Court should be affirmed in light of Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 
833 (1997), and Staelens v. Staelens, cited earlier.  We find 
neither case to be persuasive under the circumstances of this 
case.  In Boggs, the Supreme Court held that ERISA 
preempted a state community property law, and stated that 
“the diversion of retirement benefits will occur regardless of 
whether the interest in the pension plan is enforced against the 
plan or the recipient of the pension benefit.”  520 U.S. at 853.  
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The “interest” at issue in Boggs, however, was an “interest in 
undistributed pension plan benefits.”  Id. at 836 (emphasis 
added).  Here, of course, the question is whether the Estate 
can sue Adele after the funds have been distributed to her.6
 
   
Staelens is similarly inapposite.  There, the District 
Court of Massachusetts held that a decedent’s estate could not 
sue the decedent’s ex-wife to enforce her purported waiver, 
but based its decision on the fact that the language of the 
divorce decree “lack[ed] the specificity” required for a valid 
common law waiver.  677 F. Supp. 2d at 510.  Prior to 
reaching this conclusion, the court did state that allowing a 
decedent’s estate to sue a named beneficiary to enforce a 
waiver “would appear to go against the various interests 
                                                 
6  Other courts considering the question before us have held 
that Boggs is distinguishable for the same reason.  See 
Pardee, 112 P.3d at 313-14 (“As Boggs involved pre-
distribution funds as opposed to distributed funds, as in the 
present case, this Court finds Boggs distinguishable and, here, 
inapplicable.”); see also Sweebe, 712 N.W.2d at 713 
(distinguishing Boggs on the ground that it involved 
“proceeds from an undistributed pension plan”); Alcorn, 708 
S.E.2d at 392 (finding Boggs unpersuasive because it 
“involved pre-distribution funds still in control of the plan 
administrator”).  Boggs is further distinguishable because it 
involved an attempted testamentary transfer of an interest in 
pension benefits that constituted “a prohibited ‘assignment or 
alienation’” under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).  520 U.S. at 851.  
The Boggs Court explained that Congress prohibited such 
assignments out of a concern that “retirees could find their 
retirement benefits reduced by substantial sums because they 
have been diverted to testamentary recipients.”  Id. at 852.  In 
this case, however, Adele’s waiver is a simple relinquishment 
of benefits and not an attempt to assign benefits to another 
party or to “divert” funds away from plan participants or 
beneficiaries.  Thus, the concern of Boggs—“that retirement 
funds are there when a plan’s participants and beneficiaries 
expect them”—is not implicated by a waiver that is no more 
than “a mechanism for simply renouncing a claim to 
benefits.”  Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 296. 
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which the Supreme Court [in Kennedy] deemed served by a 
uniform administrative scheme.”  Id. at 508.  The court, 
however, then “acknowledge[d] that the First Circuit itself . . . 
appears to have treated distributed funds differently, albeit in 
a somewhat different context.”  Id. (citing Hoult, 373 F.3d at 
54).  Recognizing what appeared to be the law of the circuit in 
which it sat, the court avoided the question of whether the 
estate could sue the ex-wife directly and instead based its 
decision on narrow grounds related to the specificity of the 
contract language.   
 
C.  Adele’s State Law Argument 
 Finally, Adele contends that even if we determine that 
the Estate can bring suit against her to enforce her waiver, we 
should nonetheless affirm the District Court because, despite 
the fact that she waived her right to the 401(k) proceeds,7
 
 
William, who died intestate, “chose to give his 401K to [her] 
after he died.”  (Appellees’ Br. at 5.)  This argument was 
neither raised in the District Court nor mentioned in the 
Court’s opinion, and we do not address it further.   
IV.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and 
reverse in part the order of the District Court.  The cause will 
be remanded to the District Court with instructions to assess 
the necessity of a further remand to state court to address the 
merits of any remaining state law issue.   
                                                 
7  Although the District Court did not address whether the 
waiver contained in the PSA was valid as a matter of federal 
common law, Adele concedes its validity.  (See Appellees’ 
Br. at 5 [“Ms. Kensinger did indeed give up her right to Mr. 
Kensinger’s 401K.”].)  Moreover, the language of Adele’s 
waiver is similar to waiver language that has been deemed 
valid in other cases, see, e.g., Altobelli v. Int’l Bus. Machs. 
Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1996), overruled on other 
grounds by Kennedy, 555 U.S. 285, and there is no suggestion 
that Adele’s waiver was not knowing, not voluntary, or not 
made in good faith.  
